WILL BUSH ACCEPT A DEFEAT IN IRAQ?

Robert Dreyfuss asks how far Bush will go to stave off a defeat in Iraq.

This is one of those questions that keeps me awake at night. Knowing as we do the stubbornness, pride and arrogant confidence of the man, can we really believe that Dubya will meekly acknowledge an impossible situation and cut our losses in Iraq? Or is it more likely that he'll call down the wrath of hell (that's Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld and all their toys) upon the nation to preserve American claims to Iraqi oil and permanent U.S. bases? Can Bush's fragile character take such a stinging defeat without fighting back (so long as other bodies are doing the actual fighting)? And if, as he's said, he believes that God commanded him to take on this little project, would the Chimpster dare let God down by quitting without "winning"?

I fear and dread the prospect of a late-summer escalation -- just (coincidentally) in time for the '06 elections.

Rational observers can only conclude that the U.S. occupation army in Iraq has no place in the midst of a civil war. But in the midst of such an escalating mess, how could Bush withdraw? The Bush administration is like the proverbial kid with a hand stuck in the cookie jar, grabbing a fistful of goodies. In order to get out of Iraq, Bush would have to let go of Iraq's goodies. In this case, that means letting go of Iraq's oil, and letting go of the dream that Iraq can become the anchor for a long-term U.S. military and economic presence in the Persian Gulf. To do so would mean a humiliating public admission of defeat -- defeat for the idea of Americanizing Iraq, defeat for America's hope of establishing hegemony in the Gulf, and defeat for the neoconservatives' determination to use military "shock and awe" tactics to intimidate potential regional rivals and opponents around the world. All of that would be gone -- and in the most public way possible.

Which brings us to former CIA officer Reuel Marc Gerecht, currently a fellow at the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute. In 2002-03, Gerecht was among the loudest proponents of giving the Arabs the old shock-and-awe treatment, arguing that Iraqis, Arabs and Middle Easterners in general only understand the language of force. Writing in the Wall Street Journal on April 3, Gerecht warned bluntly that for the United States to succeed in Iraq might require far more bloody-minded tactics than have been utilized thus far. First, Gerecht notes with satisfaction that many Sunnis have been frightened and intimidated by Shiite militias, adding: "Sunni and Kurdish fear of Shiite power ... is politically overdue and healthy for all concerned." And then he gets to the heart of the matter:

"The Bush administration would be wise not to postpone any longer what it should have already undertaken -- securing Baghdad ... Pacifying Baghdad will be politically convulsive and provide horrific film footage and skyrocketing body counts. But Iraq cannot heal itself so long as Baghdad remains a deadly place."

Does Gerecht's proposal foreshadow a new effort, a last push, by neoconservatives to urge the administration to "win" the war in Iraq by overwhelming force, by sending yet more U.S. forces to engage in yet more fruitless shock-and-awe fantasies? Do Khalilzad's recent get-tough-on-Iran remarks foreshadow a neoconservative effort to expand the losing war in Iraq into Iran itself, while casting blame on Iran for the U.S. failure to secure or pacify Iraq?